Iran’s power structure: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the security forces that continue to hold the regime together amid rising unrest. Illustration: The Times of Jumland
Iran is facing protests, but the regime is not close to collapse. Street anger alone is not enough to break the system. Power in Iran is protected by force, organization, and loyalty.
Iran does not depend on one army. It has two. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, known as the IRGC, is the most powerful force in the country. It exists to protect the regime, not the people. Under the IRGC operates the Basij militia, which is used mainly to suppress protests. Basij forces move quickly on motorcycles and armored vehicles and are trained to break up demonstrations before they grow.
Alongside this force is Iran’s regular army. Its role is to defend the country’s borders, not to control the streets. In 1979, this army refused to fire on protesters, which helped the old regime fall. Today, there are no signs of such hesitation. The IRGC and Basij remain fully loyal and motivated to defend the system.
Protesters currently have little chance against these forces. They are small in number and poorly coordinated. There is no single leadership, no unified plan, and no clear demand shared by everyone. Some people protest for jobs, electricity, and water. Others want the regime removed. These different goals prevent a nationwide uprising.
The state also avoids mass killing. This is deliberate. Security forces step back when protests stay local or economic. They mostly use tear gas and stun grenades. Live fire is limited. This keeps death tolls low and avoids global outrage or legal justification for foreign military intervention.
Because of this, neither the United States nor Israel has a strong reason to attack Iran now. A foreign strike would likely unite Iranians behind the regime, as happened during the Iran-Iraq war. Iranian retaliation could hit U.S. bases across the region and raise the cost of war dramatically.
Iran’s missile and nuclear programs are also not at an immediate crisis point. Uranium enrichment has not resumed. Israeli strikes have damaged missile production and are still limited. There is no urgent trigger that demands military action.
Iran’s leadership understands that a direct attack on Israel would change everything. It would justify a comprehensive strike on the IRGC, Basij, and the army, and could accelerate the regime’s collapse. For that reason, Iran avoids open war.
For now, the regime survives. Not because it is loved, but because it is disciplined, armed, and cautious. Protest alone cannot break it. Anger without unity does not overturn power.
But this stability is not permanent. It is conditional.
The system depends on three things holding together at the same time: loyal security forces, divided protesters, and the absence of a trigger that forces external action. If even one of these breaks, the balance shifts.
If protests move beyond economic anger and turn political, nationwide, and coordinated, repression becomes harder. If divisions appear inside the IRGC or Basij, even at lower levels, control weakens. And if Iran crosses a red line through a nuclear move, a regional strike, or a direct attack on Israel, the restraint of the United States and Israel ends.
That is the danger the regime understands. That is why it avoids mass killing. That is why it avoids open war. That is why it moves carefully, even while it holds power tightly.
Iran has not fallen yet. But it is also not safe.
The question is no longer whether the regime is strong enough to survive protests.
The question is how long it can survive without making a mistake.
The question is how long it can survive without making a mistake.
However, several historical records prove that closed systems under pressure eventually do.
